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CONTRACT AND CARE
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN*
INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising in a society which offers, as icon, a construct
of the autonomous individual and which trusts, as an ordering
mechanism, the abstraction of an efficiency-seeking market, that
sooner or later there would be a radical attack on any existing notion
that there is some collective responsibility for children and other
dependent persons.' We have a historic and highly romanticized
affair with the ideal of the private and the individual, as contrasted
with the public and the collective, as the appropriate units of focus in
determining social good. After all, the very concept of the private
defines the domain of the individual-an unregulated space where
individual freedom reigns and in which each would-be-king can
construct his castle. If a child is part of that private landscape, it is
deemed a private matter, not the occasion for public subsidy or
support. Children are like any other item of consumption, a matter of
individual preference and individual responsibility.2
Somewhat surprising, however, is the fact that some of today's
extreme rhetoric extolling private rather than public responsibility for
dependency has come from self-identified feminist legal scholars and
* Dorothea S. Clarke Professor of Feminist Jurisprudence, Cornell Law School. I would
like to express my appreciation to Cornell law students Kristine Shaw and Melanie Chieu, who
assisted in the preparation of this Article, as well as to Professor Risa Lieberwitz, who read and
commented on an earlier draft.
1. This attack is epitomized by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, which limited aid to families in poverty in order to "end the dependence of
needy parents." 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1999) (originally enacted as Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
§ 401(a)(2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2133); see also ELINOR BURKET-r, THE BABY BOON 183 (2000)
(arguing that childless workers are stigmatized and exploited, in order to accommodate parents
in the workplace). For a discussion of Burkett's book, see Andrew Hacker, The Case Against
Kids, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 30, 2000, at 12 (book review).
2. I have referred to this as the "Porsche preference," Martha Albertson Fineman,
Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 21 n.15 (1999) (addressing the argument that the preference to
have a child is no more deserving of subsidy than any other preference, including the preference
to own a Porsche).
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scholars otherwise aligning themselves with progressive positions.
Some are led to a privatizing position through the logic of economic
analysis with its emphasis on efficiency and utility.3 Of course,
feminist theorists come in all ideological preferences, but most are at
least skeptical about privatization as a route of first resort for serious
social policy issues.4  In fact, one of the few common threads in
feminist theory has been woven by expanding on the fundamental
insight that "the personal is the political."5 Feminists have risen to
breach the historic maintenance of a distinction between the "public"
and the "private," writing volumes to show the interdependence and
relationship between these "spheres," demonstrating, for example,
the treacherousness of the protection of family privacy from a wife or
child's perspective. 6
Of particular relevance to the debates about dependency are
feminist attempts to show the ways in which the dichotomous
concepts of public and private have significant political implications. 7
These concepts represent more than mere labels. They interact as
ideological channels for the allocation of societal resources, including
the resources of power and authority. These concepts have
3. This opinion was expressed by several participants at the "Uncomfortable
Conversation" panel discussions on "Children: Public Good and Personal Responsibility?"
sponsored by the Feminism and Legal Theory Project and held on November 19 and 20, 1999, at
Cornell Law School.
4. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L
REV. 1207, 1211 (1999) (noting that "[t]here has been quite a bit of debate in recent years about
the effectiveness, as well as the wisdom, of using privacy to secure individual rights"); see also
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 187, 190-94
(1989); Martha A. Ackelsberg & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Privacy, Publicity, and Power: A
Feminist Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL:
FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY
213, 217-20, 228-29 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996) [hereinafter
REVISIONING THE POLITICAL]; Anita L. Allen, Privacy at Home: The Twofold Problem, in
REVISIONING THE POLITICAL, supra, at 193, 207-09; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,985-89 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 515, 535 (1982). "[The personal is
political] ... means that women's distinctive experience as women occurs within that sphere that
has been socially lived as the personal- private, emotional, interiorized, particular,
individuated, intimate-so that what it is to know the politics of woman's situation is to know
women's personal lives." Id.
6. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 1217-19 (discussing the critique of privacy by feminists
and child advocates including Elizabeth Schneider, Catharine MacKinnon, Anita Allen, and
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse).
7. See id. at 1223 (arguing that autonomy, an updated version of privacy, if extended to
caretaker-dependent units would be beneficial to the unit and society); Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955,
972 (1991) (concluding that the privacy doctrine, as presently conceived, will not extend to
protect the decision-making autonomy and dignity of poor and single mothers).
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tremendous political and practical implications. Designation of some
institutions in legal discourse as "public," while others are considered
"private," has implications for the manner and method of state
regulation and perceived legitimacy of collective subsidy. This
dichotomous classification also shapes contrasting norms of
interaction and expectation within and between the designated
societal spheres.8
The idea that the private is generally preferable as a means of
responding to need and dependency is more and more firmly
enmeshed with our sense of social justice-informing the unwritten
''social contract" that guides and gauges the relationship among
individuals, societal institutions, and the state. As it evolves, our
understanding of the contours of an interwoven, collective set of
responsibilities and entitlements-what may be referred to as our
"social contract" -seems to be expanding along the private axis.
Privatization is increasingly seen as the solution to complicated social
problems reflecting persistent inequality and poverty.9 The rhetoric
surrounding many current policy debates urges previously public
concerns to be transferred to the magic realm of the private solution.
From welfare reform to the construction of ideal educational or
prison systems, the assertion is that the private market can better
address historically public issues than can the public government.
My argument in this Article is a mirror image of such debates
about the newly perceived advantages of the private sector assuming
tasks historically located within the public sphere. In the pages that
follow I argue for the assertion of collective or public responsibility
for dependency-a status or condition that historically has been
deemed appropriately assigned to the private sphere.
As things now stand, dependency is the responsibility of the
family in the first instance. The family is considered to be the
quintessentially private institution.10 Therefore, the public nature of
8. This is manifest in the historic designation of the "separate spheres" in common law.
The family and other institutions of care and altruism occupied the private (female) sphere,
while the market and state were in the public (male) domain. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 132 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (commenting "[t]hat God designed the sexes
to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute
the laws").
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1999) (originally enacted as Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
§ 408(a)(5), 110 Stat. 2134, 2136) (seeking to "solve" teenage parenting concerns by requiring
denial of public assistance to teenage parents unless they live with their parents-in other
words, sending them back to their families).
10. The family is the quintessentially "private" institution-the sphere that is theoretically
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dependency is hidden, privatized within the family, rendering
decisions about public responsibility unnecessary, except for those
stigmatized families that "fail" in meeting their responsibilities.
One focus for the dissatisfaction with the privatization of
dependency is the continuing unequal and gendered division of family
labor, which burdens women more than men. Within the family,
there is also delegation of responsibility for dependency- caretaking
has traditionally been and largely remains gendered work, assigned to
those in the family roles of wife, mother, grandmother, daughter, and
daughter-in-law.
As developed in other essays, my assertion is that dependency
warrants a more public, supportive, and collective response to the
needs of caretakers. This assertion is grounded in an obvious social
fact: caretaking work supplies an important and essential public good.
Every society and every institution in society is dependent upon
caretaking labor in order to perpetuate and reproduce itself.
My question has become: Why are not both the allocation of
responsibility and the structural and economic supports for caretaking
primary considerations in public policy discussions? In debates over
social policy related to family, caretaking, and dependency, there is
little attention to figuring out what is the optimal or appropriate
distribution of responsibility for dependency across societal
institutions. Nor is there consideration of how we might structure the
corresponding relationships among government, market, and family
in regard to dependency.
Of course, we do debate and theorize about structuring
responsibilities in regard to some institutional arrangements. It is just
the family that seems to be left out of the debates. For example,
there is a great deal of attention paid to what might be the
appropriate institutional interrelationship between state and market.
Scholars and politicians set forth and defend competing positions on
how to define the appropriate balance between freedom and
responsibility, between subsidy and self-sufficiency, in regard to
protected from intervention by the state. However, paradoxically, it is also a heavily regulated
entity, with the state (through law) defining what is the core family connection and who may
attain it under what circumstances. The state also defines the consequences of family
relationship and controls the exit as well as the entrance into those relationships. See, e.g., 1
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 2000) (originally enacted as Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)) (defining "marriage" as a legal union between members of
the opposite sex only); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1999) (originally enacted as DOMA)
(permitting states to refuse to recognize same-sex relationships that are treated as "marriages"
in other states).
[Vol. 76:1403
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economic and regulatory matters involving state and market
institutions.
My task to is to lay the foundation for similar arguments about
the family and its interrelationship with other societal institutions.
How should the work associated with dependency be distributed?
Should caretaking be publicly subsidized and supported or kept
within the private family? How can we justly allocate costs of
caretaking? Of course, my goal in developing arguments is ultimately
to compel the state and the market to assume more (some)
responsibility for dependency.
Conceding (in order to avoid disputing) that the historic
designation of dependency as private was justified, in this Article I
argue that the fact that society has changed in important ways makes
the continuation of a private system for handling dependency
untenable. Social practice and social institutions evolve and the
theoretical implications of such changes must be addressed as primary
societal institutions such as the family are transformed. Do such
transformations necessitate a reconsideration of the societal tasks that
they have been historically assigned? Do profound changes in the
essential nature and structure of the family make continued
delegation of primary, almost exclusive, responsibility for dependency
unjust and unworkable?
Of course, not all change mandates societal response and
adjustment. It is not only the extent of the societal change in the
family that demands we now reconsider the configuration of
coterminous societal institutions such as market and state. It is also
the nature of the changes in the family. The family has become more
egalitarian, permitting greater inclusion and participation by women
in the public aspects of citizenship. These types of changes should be
affirmatively supported and facilitated by adjustments to existing
institutional arrangements.
In developing an argument about the need for adjustment in our
basic social structures, I use the concept of contract. Specifically, I
resort to the metaphor of "social contract" as a way to think about
how institutions and relationships are thought to embody norms of
justice asserted to be shared in and by members of a society. I do not
intend to engage in the extensive, abstract (often turgid) debates
about social contract theory undertaken by political theorists. My
modest objective is to use the very modern concept of contract to
question the justice of contemporary institutional relationships.
2001]
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Contract is a useful tool with which to examine family
relationships-relationships that have their roots in the more ancient
realms of status and hierarchy." It is a useful rhetorical device
because it reflects a process whereby individuals are given the means
to voluntarily and willingly assume obligations and gain entitlements.
Although contract as an ordering mechanism generally brings
"stability" (and enforceability) to relationships, contract theory also
takes into account the possibility of change. In using the concept of
social contract, I am particularly interested in exploring the tensions
in the relationship between the social contract and societal change.
Change can destabilize existing relationships. In this regard, the
idea that contracts are made in the context of "background"
conditions-conditions essential to the continued viability of ongoing
contractual relationships-supports my argument that our social
contract needs to be reworked. Once the background conditions
have shifted precariously in ways that make existing relationships
impossible or unjust, the terms of the initial covenant must be
reassessed. Recognition that there are background conditions is a
way to place social contractarian expectations in historical context.
Arguments about changed societal context are a way to destabilize
our satisfaction with existing relationships among state, market, and
family in regard to responsibility for dependency.
I conclude this Article with a plea to feminists and other
progressive persons who may place faith in the process of
privatization (or in the concept of the private as synonymous with
"just" and "fair"). I ask them to embrace the positive changes that
are occurring in the "private" family and to join in a restructuring of
the public, forsaking the societally isolated and normatively
impoverished pursuit of the private. Considering the obligations the
state and market have to those who care for others provides the basis
for arguments that these public institutions must be responsive.
11. See generally SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 174 (6th prtg. 1920) ("[Tlhe
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.").
[Vol. 76:1403
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I. DEPENDENCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND SOCIAL
DEBT12
In the current political climate, those who are concerned with the
welfare of children and other vulnerable members of society need a
theory of dependency. This theory would support arguments for
collective responsibility- public and private subsidies for the
caretaking/dependent relationship. It would also provide the basis for
structural adjustments to market and other public institutions in order
to accommodate caretaking so that caretakers do not have to
compromise care in order to engage in wage work.
To this end, I have written extensively on the subjects of
dependency and subsidy. I have posited that although these are
highly stigmatized terms in today's political climate,13  both
dependency and subsidy are universal in our society. 14 All of us are or
have been dependent and all are or have been recipients of significant
social subsidy. I have identified as of particular societal concern two
types of dependency, "inevitable"' 5 and "derivative. ' 16 I have argued
12. This Part summarizes some of my earlier work on dependency and subsidy. See
generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Fineman, supra note 2.
13. In law and political discourse today the world is divided up and institutions (and their
interactions) characterized along inappropriate fault lines. These lines are found in the
unsupportable distinctions we make between categories such as the public and private, the
individual and the collective, the independent and the dependent, the self-sufficient and the
subsidized, as well as our fascination with market and contract as ordering mechanisms because
they valorize the private, the individual, the independent, and the self-sufficient.
14. Articles such as Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-
Sufficiency demonstrate my foundational idea that dependency is a universal and inevitable part
of the human condition, therefore of collective or societal concern and, ultimately, collective
responsibility. Fineman, supra note 2, at 25-26. Independence, understood as refusal to rely on
others to supply the resources to meet our needs, is an illusion. Subsidy, which is the allocation
of resources to some in society rather than to others, because of their status, contribution, need,
or position, is universal. In this society no one is totally self-sufficient, either economically or
socially. We all live subsidized lives, whether the benefits we receive are financial (such as in
governmental transfer programs or favorable tax policy), or nonmonetary (such as those
provided by the uncompensated labor of others in caring for us and our needs). The interesting
question in our subsidy society therefore is why some subsidies are differentiated and
stigmatized while others are hidden. Subsidies to market institutions and middle-class families
are termed investments, incentives, or earned when government supplies them and called gifts,
charity, or the product of familial love when they are contributions of caretaking labor. To a
great extent stigma is attached only to those subsides that we as a society feel are required
because of individual or family failure, or that provide for those who are thought not to engage
in socially productive activity.
15. All of us were dependent as children and many of us will be dependent as we age,
become ill, or suffer disabilities. In this sense, at least one form of dependency is "inevitable."
Note that the examples I have chosen to illustrate this category of inevitable dependency are
biological or physical in nature. Biological dependencies do not exhaust the potential range of
situations of dependence, however, or the possible categories for cataloguing reliance on others.
In addition to biological dependence, many of us are economically or emotionally dependent on
2001] 1409
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that society must respond to these forms of dependency in order to
reproduce itself-to reproduce the workers, the citizens, the con-
sumers, etcetera, who populate society and its institutions.
Caretaking labor preserves and perpetuates society and, therefore,
collective response and responsibility is warranted.17 Because of its
public value, I have asserted that caretaking labor creates a societal or
others. These other forms of dependence may even tend to accompany the physical type that I
have labeled inevitable.
16. Derivative dependency arises on the part of the person who assumes responsibility for
the care of the inevitable dependent person. I refer to this form of dependency as derivative to
capture the very simple point that those who care for others are themselves dependent on
resources in order to undertake that care. Derivative dependency has both economic and
structural dimensions. The economic issues are related to the fact that within families,
caretaking work is unpaid. The structural dimension is due to the fact that caretakers do their
caretaking within societal contexts and rely on some institutional accommodation or
noneconomic resources to assist in their labor. Far from structurally accommodating or
facilitating caretaking, workplaces operate according to premises that mean that domestic
dependency labor is incompatible with the norms and practices of paid labor. For those who
have assumed the responsibilities of caretaking, current workplace expectations compete with
the demands of dependency and, in this regard, caretaking interferes with or even precludes
participation in the paid labor force. Derivative dependency, while it is inevitably associated
with the tasks of caretaking, is not universal (and therefore not inevitably a part of each
individual's experience). Derivative dependency is socially produced and structured in the
context of existing societal institutions. Many people in our society totally escape assuming
caretaking of others, in fact are freed for other pursuits by the caretaking labor of others.
17. There are essential tasks to be performed in every society that are the legitimate
concern of the state. One of these is certainly the response to dependency. See Fineman, supra
note 2, at 26-27. The fact that biological dependency is inherent in the human condition means
that it is of collective or societal concern. Individual dependency needs must be met if we as
individuals are to survive, and our aggregate or collective dependency needs must be met if our
society is to survive and perpetuate itself. It is this ultimate societal dependence on caretakers
that mandates that dependency must be considered a responsibility of the collective society.
The mandate that the state (collective society) respond to dependency, therefore, is not a matter
of altruism or empathy (which are individual responses often resulting in charity), but is primary
and essential because such a response is fundamentally society preserving. If infants or ill
persons are not cared for, nurtured, nourished, and, perhaps, loved they will perish-we could
say that they, therefore, owe an individual debt to their caretakers. But, it should also be
apparent that without this type of caretaking in the aggregate there could be no society.
Caretaking labor produces and reproduces society. It provides the citizens, the workers, the
voters, the consumers, the students, and so on that populate our society and its institutions. This
labor is an unrecognized subsidy, not only to the individuals who directly receive it, but more
significantly, to the entire society. If this is true, the provision of care must be recognized as a
central and fundamental social task, and we should examine how it is performed. Society-
preserving tasks are commonly delegated to only some members of society, accomplished
through the establishment and maintenance of societal institutions. The armed services, for
example, attends to the collective need for national defense by structuring it as both the
responsibility of only some members (volunteers or draftees) and of us all (taxpayers and
voters). These institutions should operate consistently with our deeply held beliefs about how
rights and obligations are accrued and imposed in a just society-they have both an individual
and a collective dimension. Certain members of society may be recruited, volunteer, or even be
drafted for service, but they have a right to be compensated for their service from collective
resources, to be protected by rules and policies that facilitate as well as reward their
performance, and to not be labeled "dependent" as a result. Caretakers should have the same
rights in recognition of their society-preserving labor.
[Vol. 76:1403
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social debt-a debt that binds each and every member of society, not
only individual family members or receivers of care. Further, this
debt is owed generally, to caretakers as a group, and cannot be
discharged by merely being supportive of one's own caretaker
(mother or wife, for example). 18
However, even though there may be some recognition that
caretaking is of public benefit, no compensation and scant
accommodation have been given to caretakers by societal institutions
other than the family. Instead of being compensated or accom-
modated, caretaking labor is expected to be gratuitously and
uncomplainingly supplied. Even when nonfamily members, such as
nannies or nurses, supply caretaking labor, the family remains
primarily responsible for the care. The wages are supplied from
family funds (ensuring they remain low). In rare instances there is a
more communal approach to caretaking and a nonfamily unit
assumes some financial responsibility, such as company-sponsored
childcare or home health aides provided by public funds. But such
assistance is not compelled (in fact is contradicted) by our
understanding of who is responsible for dependency. This sort of
assistance also is viewed as merely supplementing the primary
responsibility of the family.
There is also a problem from the perspective of the caretaker.
Caretaking has costs and, as things are currently arranged, these costs
are typically borne by the caretaker alone. If she is lucky, she is able
to persuade her partner in the private family to share the costs with
her, spreading them out a bit. But the costs remain confined to the
family in a world in which market institutions assume workers are
unencumbered by family and dependency and the government
assumes that (functioning) families provide for basic needs.
The material consequences of caretaking are economic-
resulting from a caretaker's need to focus energy and time on
dependency work rather than investing that energy and time in
18. It is of particular interest in understanding the philosophy of the social contract to
understand how essential, state-preserving tasks are distributed among the complementary
institutions which the state condones and constructs and through the state itself via the more
public, explicit, and direct actions undertaken via politicians and other state personnel. In
addition to caretaking, activities primary to the maintenance and preservation of society are
those activities such as governance, trade, market production, propaganda, expansion, peace,
and public safety. In this regard, the state must be understood as contingent at the same time as
it is omnipotent-encompassing, containing, and mediating among social institutions at the
same time as it is defined and redefined by these very same institutions as they produce ideas
and generate claims and demands.
20011
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building market and other skills that would increase her value in the
compensated sphere. Costs to the caretaker also can be psychological
or spiritual in nature-resulting from the attenuated and compro-
mised relationships a caretaker is forced to have with both market
and family if she works in both, or from the need to choose, thus
sacrificing one to gain the other.19 The caretaker is caught within
social configurations and institutional arrangements that are unjust.20
This injustice can only be addressed by policies that both
subsidize and accommodate caretakers.2 1  First the economic
consequences of dependency and caretaking must be addressed
through governmental policies, using regulation and taxation to
distribute of some of society's accumulated wealth to caretakers and
their dependents. Basic social goods such as child allowances, health
insurance, and childcare or respite care would be considered a public
responsibility, for example.22
In addition, there are penalties that workers (at least those who
are also caretakers) currently suffer while market institutions are
relieved of responsibility for dependency (in fact, are even free to
punish the dually responsible worker). These penalties must be
removed and there must be a more equitable distribution of
responsibility for dependency among the primary societal institutions
of family, market, and state. 23 Adequately responding to dependency
requires a restructuring of market institutions so that work for pay is
compatible with caretaking responsibilities. This aspect of
responding to dependency would lead us to reorient our workplaces
19. See VICrOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 60-64 (1988)
(discussing the hidden costs of children for women in the workplace); cf. Vicki Schultz, Life's
Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1894 (2000) (arguing that women do not choose lower-paying,
lower-status jobs because of their heavier family obligations, but rather that the segregation of
women into these jobs forces women into household labor).
20. Caretaking remains gendered in practice, but it is important to note that when men do
care work they also suffer costs. It is the caretaking itself, not the gender of the caretaker, that
is inherently disadvantageous in our system.
21. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2.
22. 5.3 billion dollars was budgeted for Head Start in 2000. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., PRESIDENT'S FY 2000 BUDGET 74 (1999), at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/
fy01budget/hhs2000.pdf (last revised Jan. 23, 2001) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
However, for purposes of comparison, over 7.9 billion dollars has been budgeted for air force
aircraft acquisitions for this year (B-2 stealth bombers, Raptors, etc.). U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001: PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS
BY WEAPON SYSTEM, at i (2000), at http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2OOlbudget/fy2OOl-
budget.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review). This figure
does not include any acquisitions for missiles, or aircraft for the other branches of the military.
Id.
23. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2.
[Vol. 76:1403
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around a "dually responsible" worker-a worker who has caretaking
obligations that warrant accommodation and integration with the
workplace and its obligations.
II. THE METAPHORIC CONTRACT- ORDERING THE PUBLIC,
DEFINING THE PRIVATE
In the sprawling, secular American context, appeals to social
cohesion based on religious principles or on shared, limited
geographic boundaries are of limited usefulness. Voluntary
participation in societal institutions may generate identification with a
group, but this too is limited. A national identity can be based on
acceptance of a shared or common language, culture, or history, but
in pluralistic and diverse societies citizens often are fragmented along
exactly these lines. One way to conceive of national community is
through the establishment and transmission of myths or fundamental
principles addressing the way society is ordered. These principles can
be viewed as cohesive, symbolizing a social compact or contract
among otherwise strangers. The metaphoric or symbolic idea of a
social contract connotes a sense of connectedness and unity among
those in a society in the same way that contracts between individuals
reflect binding relationships.
In fact, in the modern context, one of the primary devices for
understanding individual and institutional relationships is the concept
of contract. Contract is the term we apply to all sorts of relationships,
be they formally established or implied. Contract displaces older, less
democratic ways of perceiving relationships such as status and
hierarchy. The underlying and essential elements in contract seem to
be that the relationship was voluntarily assumed (consent) and that
there was some mutually bargained-for benefit or trade involved
(exchange) that provides the basis for establishing a contractual
(reciprocal) legal relationship between individuals.2 4
Typically, contract is the way that private relationships in the so-
called public sphere are ordered -relationships in the realm of the
market and related arenas.25 The idea of contract, both as a means of
24. Law students are very attached to the idea of contract. Many would use it to resolve all
sorts of difficult social policy and economic resource issues. The idea of consent is particularly
potent ... i.e., he or she asked for it. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 1, 3 (1981) (defining contract, agreement, and bargain).
25. Relationships within the family are considered beyond contract, their legality and
consequences governed by status or policy principles. In the private family, however,
relationships are to a large degree the product of state imposed obligations, independent of
20011
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determining appropriate ways and conditions to bind individuals and
as an ordering mechanism establishing predictable actions or inter-
actions, is also useful for understanding societal or institutional
arrangements.
A. The Social Contract
Just as reference to contract in the private (public)6 market
context carries with it the understanding that the agreement it
embodies is fair because it was bargained for and agreed to by the
parties, a reference to the social contract 27 is an implicit claim about
formal agreements between family members and based more on an idea of status than contract.
26. See discussion of the chameleon-like nature of the market infra pp. 1417-18.
27. Two positions often compared with each other as contrasting models of social
organization are illustrated by the works of Robert Nozick and John Rawls. Nozick's position is
that basic social relationships are found in the interaction among autonomous and independent
individuals, ideally unencumbered and unburdened by legal regulation and state interventions.
See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Nozick begins with
the heuristic assumption that in the state of nature, an individual owns himself, his own labor,
and any property it produces or procures. In this regard, the state would appropriately assume
responsibility for the mechanisms whereby a free market (for individual transactions) might be
facilitated and maintained; but beyond police protection and institutions such as courts for the
maintenance of order, enforcement of contract, and transmission of property, the role of the
state would be minimal. Individuals owe little to the collective and have no moral or legal
responsibility. The market is the basic social institution, distributing goods and values in a
manner that is both just and efficient. If individuals fail, it is their own responsibility and
reflects lack of ambition, motivation, or talent. This position defines the basic parameters of the
economic "conservative" argument today. Market relations are viewed as the most efficient
way to create individual wealth and order society. Government intervention is condemned as
fostering poverty and undermining family and other "private" institutional relations, ultimately
leading to crime, social disintegration, and disorder. Correspondingly, the solution for existing
social problems (caused by governmental intervention) is to return to the private sector-the
market-allowing it to perform the corrective function of efficient distribution. An influential
exposition of this perspective is found in GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 63 (1981).
Also illustrative are the debates concerning the revision of the welfare system. See Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101,
110 Stat. 2105, 2110-12. Rawls, in contrast to Nozick, anticipates that the collective does have
legitimate claims on the individual and that the state may appropriately work to perpetuate the
"collective good," a societal resource to which individuals may be required to contribute
through taxation and other tithes. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
Distribution of property is potentially problematic and susceptible to challenges based on
injustice. Rawls is the intellectual descendant of Locke. He bases his theory on the premises
that (1) in the original "state of nature"-the base upon which to judge the justice of our current
system-each person is in possession of his or her own labor; (2) there were resources which
were held in common prior to their appropriation by individuals; and (3) justice demands that
an individual is only able to appropriate a limited amount of property without violating
principles of just entitlement. Waste and spoilage as well as greed are to be avoided. In the
Lockean scheme, property is posited as historically common and distribution is a social or
political act that can provoke questions of distributive justice. Rawls introduces into this
formulation a construct that is useful in arguing that wealth redistribution should take place. In
essence Rawls asserts that justice demands that the principles which govern society be those that
citizens would invent from the perspective of the "original position." The citizens engaged in
this experiment have all the information they need about society and its functioning, but are
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the justice of the set of expectations, obligations, rights, and
entitlements afforded an individual with regard to societal
arrangements. Of course, in considering the social contract we
encounter an arrangement that is not the product of individual
bargaining or agreement. One is born into the social contract.
Perhaps, for this reason alone, we must be more attentive to its
fairness, the state assuming a more active role in monitoring the terms
of the social as compared to private contracts in general.
The social contract serves as an explanation of society-
legitimizing and justifying existing relationships. The concept of a
social contract in this regard bolsters the status quo. It is a stabilizing
device and can be wielded even to justify unequal financial and power
distributions produced by market institutions. In fact, the idea of a
social contract makes intelligible the fact that a modern, egalitarian-
oriented, democratic state can accept, even condone, some degree
and forms of inequality.28
prevented by a "veil of ignorance" from knowing what individual characteristics they will
possess in the society. From this vantage (or disadvantage), the members of society can bargain
and deliberate about what general rules should govern them all. Because they are ignorant of
the class, social position, and individual characteristics they will attain in the "real" world, there
is no incentive to bargain to attain special advantages for one group. Justice will be free to
emerge when considerations are disassociated from the individual characteristics and identities
of the arbiters of fairness. As part of the theoretical framework, Rawls presents two principles
of justice: equal basic liberty and the difference principle. These principles mandate that when
there are potential differences in social goods such as power, authority, wealth, or leisure, the
distribution that is just is that which most benefits the most disadvantaged members of society.
Differences in social goods are acceptable only if they are attached to positions open to all
under the principle of equal liberty (or opportunity). Rawls has been criticized for this
construct. The criticisms are not relevant to this discussion, which is developed merely to sketch
out the different approaches to economic equality that have been influential during the latter
part of the twentieth century. Criticism aside, it seems hard to refute the argument that one's
perception of justice might be altered if one were not sure what set of individual and group
characteristics with attendant entitlements and social advantages he or she would have in a
world where poverty, illness, prejudice, and catastrophe were facts of many peoples' everyday
life.
28. Feminist theorists, most notably Susan Moller Okin, have criticized mainstream
philosophers such as Nozick and Rawls for their failure to specifically theorize the family in
articulating ideas about justice. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 87, 93 (1989). Okin is mainly concerned with the onission of a sense of what would
constitute justice within the gender system represented (or implemented) so well in the family.
I agree with her criticism. The Rawlsian position is incomplete and unsatisfying because it
proceeds from the wrong set of assumptions. Rawls's position (and those that are conceptually
compatible) proceed on the basis of arguments appealing to empathy-to the idea that
inevitably there are going to be victims in any form of social organization. If someone is
operating from a position of ignorance, they will not know in advance what social disadvantages
they will possess and will, thus, be fair in devising (or consenting to) a system of distribution.
Rawls addresses many of the characteristics that are typically designated as disadvantages, such
as race, class, gender, etc. However, in failing to confront family position as conferring
advantage or disadvantage, Rawls leaves an empirically significant source of actual social and
economic injustice beyond his consideration. If family role were a central part of the analysis,
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One of the primary ordering devices of the social contract is the
distribution of social institutions into categories with policy
implications. Concepts of "public" and "private," in particular,
structure the relationship between the state and the market on one
hand and the family on the other. Inherently neutral socially devised
institutions, which could otherwise be considered public, if designated
as decidedly private are thus shielded from public supervision and
control. The preexisting societal arrangement-the social contract-
evidences a historically agreed upon restraint on governmental
regulatory zeal.
There remains substantial debate about the scope of the restraint
on government implicated in the designation of an institution as
public. One's position on the issue of governmental restraint can
reflect an ideological predisposition in regard to a number of impor-
tant policy and legal debates. For example, economic libertarians and
other "free market" proponents assert social contractarian terms that
would leave most things, aside from military matters, to the "private
sector" - to individuals acting in markets or within families or, if
absolutely necessary, to small units of government.2 9 Individuals thus
freed from governmental restraints can work out mutually beneficial,
particularized agreements among themselves within social institutions
considered private, distinguished from the public sphere exemplified
by the state or federal government.
In contrast, the terms of the social contract advocated by those
with a more social welfare-oriented perspective are more active in
defining a role for public supervision and regulation. Someone with a
politically liberal perspective might suggest that families and markets
can also fail individuals and that existing disparities in wealth and
power may be unjust, warranting some corrective measures by the
government. Some perceived injustices must be considered of a
public nature, a concession that some situations are beyond individual
power to alter. Gross inequality and inattention to the "victims" of
the structural position of the family in society and the attendant appropriation of domestic labor
by the state and the market would become apparent. This injustice should provide the occasion
for a wholesale reconsideration of the system that hides such an abuse. Rawls is also criticized
for failing to include dependencies, inevitable and derivative, in his theory. See EVA FEDER
KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 76 (1999).
Kittay argues that a society based upon a theory of the political that excludes dependency
concerns can be maintained only by the exploitation of the caretakers for the dependent
individuals or by neglecting the needs of the dependents themselves. Id. at 76-78.
29. For a succinct description of libertarian policy and theory including free-market
conservatism, see An Introduction to Libertarianism, at http://libertarian.org/intro.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2001) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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free market and family privacy are perceived of as public concerns,
justifying governmental intervention and regulatory responses. 0 This
position, while more liberal in regard to supervision, still concedes the
fundamental distinction between public and private.
The existing classification of society's three fundamental
institutions (state, family, and market) into the categories of public
and private contains some significant paradoxes. For example, while
the state is designated the quintessentially public and the family as
the quintessentially private institution (thus beyond contract), the
market and its apparatus are distinctively chameleon-like. Markets
are constructed as public (and therefore under a different,
competitive set of norms) when contrasted with the family, but as
private (and therefore not easily susceptible to public regulation)
when paired with the state. The market reaps the best of both
spheres.
Feminists have successfully deconstructed the public/private
dichotomy in the context of the family. While the family may be
viewed as private, it is highly regulated and controlled by the state.
Law defines who may marry whom and what formalities must be
observed. Only some relationships are "legitimate," or legal ones,
which carry the weight of the state behind them.3' Law defines the
consequences of marriage and parenthood during on-going
relationships and imposes significant policy directives in the context
of divorce. 32 Law also defines what the responsibilities of the family
are and what the role of the family within the larger society is. 3
The state consistently acts in ways that affect individuals. By
shaping and regulating institutions such as the family, the state
contributes to the way individuals construct their identities within
society. The state establishes norms of citizenship and community.
30. The economic redistribution in our welfare policy, however limited, and in the legal
rules readjusting traditional patriarchal power within families were products of a liberal political
view. For a brief discussion of the historical development of a lack of faith and distrust in the
market and the rise of "new" liberalism, see Liberalism in Liberalism As a Political Theory,
Property and Market, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at http://plato.stanford.edulentries/
liberalism (last visited Jan. 20, 2001) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
31. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT ("UMDA") §§ 205, 207 (amended 1971
and 1973), 9A U.L.A. 181, 183 (1998) (limiting the ability of minors to marry and prohibiting
marriages between close relations-siblings or parent and child-respectively).
32. See, e.g., UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 4, 9A U.L.A. 116 (1998) (classifying property of
spouses).
33. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 400 (1993) (discussing the construction of
family function in society and the distribution of roles within the family to meet those assigned
functions).
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Thus, the public nature of the state spills over to affect the very
workings of private life. By scooping out what is public, it also
defines what remains private.
Establishment of a dichotomous world of public and private
continues to have profound implications for theory in the nonfamily
context. The private family recedes, and the designated public
remains the focus of concern and debate. As a result, not only are the
family and dependency grossly undertheorized, the very concepts of
the "individual" and the institutions of market and state which are the
focus of theory are distorted and skewed because the family is
invisible, cast as quintessentially private and conceptually separated
from market and state. Family is wrongly assumed to be unchanging,
an essentialized institution, natural in form and function-the
repository for dependency. The sorting into public and private, once
struck, is not reconsidered.
Yet, the family exists in a world of change. The family coexists
within a changing society and is interdependent with both state and
market. Changes, fluctuations, and transformations in either of these
societal institutions will inevitably have ramifications for the family,
affecting its functioning and its members' aspirations for themselves
and for each other. Policy discussions and initiatives that fail to
recognize and address this fact are doomed to be inadequate, perhaps
even harmful. In addition to reflecting and responding to changes in
other societal institutions, the family can generate changes and
responses in other institutions. Altered patterns of family behavior
can profoundly affect market and state, placing pressures and
demands on these institutions.
In fact, the family is not a separate, private entity. Even in its
invisibility, it is central. Some vision of the family underlies debates
about public regulation and market autonomy. In our construction of
social policy we assume a family with some form and function that
complements the public institutions we explicitly address. The
traditional function of the family is that it will be the primary
repository for dependency, providing for the emotional, physical, and
developmental needs of its members. Thus, we see the untheorized
family offered as panacea, the all-purpose solution for social ills such
as poverty and crime and individual malaise such as isolation and
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unhappiness. 31 Conceptually and ideologically, the assumed family
relieves the state and the market from assuming responsibility for
delivering the day-to-day necessities and addressing the dilemmas
presented by dependency.
B. Contract and Consent
At this point I want to address the idea of "consent." The idea of
consent is related to and used as justification for the assignment of
responsibility in our society. Consent implies voluntariness as well as
the option to not consent. We can view the social contract as a
fictitious, symbolic idea embodying the notion of the legitimacy of
social arrangements based on the norm of consent. The social
contract is an ideological or rhetorical map defining the political
landscape upon which to place existing and emerging social relation-
ships.
Consent (or the notion of personal responsibility for one's
actions) is the basis for withholding public (or other) aid from
someone in a needy position. Consent in this context is tied to
individual actions or behavior. The argument may be phrased as
getting what one "asked for" or as the justice of having to "lie in the
bed" that one has "made." The idea is that individual circumstances
are the result of individual choices, freely made, and, therefore, that
consequences, even if negative, are justified.
Within the rhetoric of public and private, contract and consent,
existing institutional arrangements allow us to avoid general
responsibility for the inequity and to justify the maintenance of status
quo by reference to an abstract notion of individual "choice" or
"personal responsibility" for the life circumstances in which one finds
oneself. In this way, we can often ignore the implications of the fact
that individual choice occurs within the constraints of social
conditions (including the ideological) that funnel decisions into
prescribed channels and often operate in a practical and symbolic
manner to limit, or practically eliminate, options.
Using notions of individual choice or responsibility as
justification for existing conditions also fails to recognize that quite
often choice of one's status or position carries with it consequences
not anticipated or imagined at the time of the initial decision. For
34. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, § 101(8), 110 Stat. 2105, 2111 (listing the negative societal consequences of
nontraditional single parent homes).
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example, in assessing who should bear the burdens or costs associated
with dependency and the caretaking of children, we may believe
(cultural, familial, and societal imperatives aside) that a woman chose
to become a mother, but does this choice mean she has also
consented to the societal conditions attendant to that role and the
many ways in which that status will negatively effect her economic
prospects? Did she even realize what those costs might be? Is it even
possible that society and culture might have lead her astray on the
issue of costs, lied to her about the returns and rewards of caretaking?
Further, even if a woman did consent (in that she knew she was
taking risks or forgoing opportunities), is the ultimate situation in
which she finds herself one which society can tolerate for some of its
members? In other words, are some conditions just too oppressive or
unfair to be imposed by society even if an individual ostensibly agrees
to or chooses them? Social conditions, particularly conditions of
oppression, are of far more than individual concern. They are of
public concern-of concern to the larger society in which norms of
justice, equality, and inclusion have been fashioned by which to
measure the individual circumstances of any member or members. In
taking this measure, individual situations can inform a discussion
about the underlying fairness of the existing social contract.35
Of course, the contractual requirement of consent is problematic
in the context of establishing a social contract. The very idea of a
social contract is that it preexists and transcends any individual
citizen. Individual bargaining and specific consent are not provided
for nor required. The whole idea behind the social contract is that it
legitimates compelling the individual to concede certain existing
interactions, expectations, and relationships with societal institutions.
Consent in the social contract sense is predetermined -it is more like
concession, based on some idea of a collective good or benefit
signaling justice as well as reciprocity and abstract equality. Consent
or concession is assumed by reference to the advantages and benefits
conferred by this particular organization of society.
In our system, the government has limited authority to assess the
underlying fairness of the actual distributions or the methods of
allocation developed in market (or in the family). The government is
not generally perceived of as constituted to pursue remedial or
protective goals, such as pursuing equality or redistributing wealth in
35. For further discussion of unpacking choice, see FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 148-50, 165-
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order to counter the excesses of market institutions. The state is
constituted in order to be protective of private as well as social
contractual arrangements.
However, sometimes an argument must be made that existing
arrangements are unjust-so unjust that consent or ongoing concur-
rence should no longer be assumed. The historic social contract may
be broken or its conditions may be impossible to perform or enforce
in view of changed circumstances. If reconsideration is warranted
given change, the state is the only institution that has any arguable
mandate and capability to negotiate a reconsideration of the basic
terms of our historic societal understanding.
III. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT-PUBLIC (MIS)USE OF THE PRIVATE
FAMILY
In our current understanding, dependency is considered to be a
private matter. It is the family, not the state or the market, that
assumes responsibility for both inevitable and derivative dependency.
The institution of the family frees the market to act without
consideration or accommodation for dependency. The state is cast as
a default institution providing minimal, grudging assistance should
families fail. Each individual family is ideally responsible for its own
members' dependency, and resort to collective resources is
considered failure and deserving of condemnation and stigma.36
Institutional arrangements reflect the way in which responsibility
for dependency has been allocated to the family and not the market
(workplace) or (in any primary sense) to the government. These
three institutions are the logical subjects of politics and objects of
debates over public policy.37 Unlike more voluntary segments of
society such as religion, philanthropy, and charity, these institutions
and the rights and responsibilities of individuals participating within
36. In fact, the failure to adequately provide for its members can move a family from the
private to the public (therefore appropriately regulated and disciplined) category. See
FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 177 (chapter entitled "The Limits of Privacy-The Public Family").
37. Individuals coalesce within these institutions and also act in opposition to them. The
institutions can be understood as reflecting (and constantly reformulating) group interests and
political capital. One way to understand "the state" is to view "it" as the definable sphere of
political and regulatory life in which institutions of "private" authority are defined and given
reign to operate. The accepted scope of institutional interest or claims to authority is dependent
upon the state, but it also represents the ideological definition of the state as an instrument of
regulation and control. What is considered appropriately outside of institutional mandate is of
"public" concern, susceptible to explicit control and regulation.
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them are heavily defined and regulated by law, and are therefore
appropriately understood in the rhetoric of social contract. 8
Our attitude toward family as the appropriate repository for
dependency follows scripts rooted in historic (and therefore
contingent) ideologies, particularly those of patriarchy and
capitalism.39 These ideologies operate at an unconscious (therefore,
unexamined) level and channel our beliefs and feelings about what is
considered natural and what are appropriate social organizations. We
deem it natural that the family is the repository for dependency and
that collective responsibility is unwarranted and inappropriate. The
family also has a "natural" form-it is heterosexual and marital in
nature.40
A. The Marriage Contract
Within the institution of the family, marriage is central.
Historically, marriage as a status dictated expectations for spouses as
well as defining the marital couple's relationship to the rest of society
and its institutions.41 Increasingly as the state has become less
involved in monitoring entry and exit for the relationship, we discuss
marriage as a consensual or contractual relationship forged between
two individuals-husband and wife who are deemed marital partners
and define their own terms through contract. But this does not mean
that marriage does not continue to play a significant societal role.
38. Voluntary structures, propelled by cultural, religious, or individual values may provide
assistance. But voluntary and idiosyncratic responses are not extensive enough or sufficiently
reliable to address the needs of dependency. The state must ensure adequate resources and
accommodation. In addition, no one (and no institution) that benefits from dependency labor
should be a "free rider" on the contributions of others. Thus neither President George H.W.
Bush's "thousand points of light" nor Senator Hillary Clinton's "it takes a village" can be
considered adequate responses to dependency. See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT
TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH US (1996).
39. Racism is also relevant, particularly when we consider caretaking in the paid labor
force where women of color are substituted for the unpaid family laborer at low wages with few
benefits. I omit it here because I am focused on the family and ideology associated with its
historic role. This ideology is shared across racial and ethnic divisions in society.
40. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 1217.
41. Paradoxically, this society has designated many of our most intimate and individual
arrangements as inherently of public concern, susceptible to collectively generated norms rather
than personal decision making. There is some indication that this mindset is changing in regard
to some very limited areas. For example, contract, such as with prenuptial agreements, is now
used to alter state-imposed notions about the consequences of marriage, but many matters in
family and intimate life are not susceptible to legally enforceable agreements. Considering why
those quintessentially private things such as domestic, sexual, and reproductive relationships are
nonetheless deemed fundamentally of public concern and under governmental control should
call into question the entire tendency to categorize the world into public and private
compartments.
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Marriage on an ideological level remains significant because the
marital family remains responsible for dependency.
This may have made some sense when marriage provided (and
assumed) a certain population for the family-both a caretaker and a
wage earner who are differentiated but complementary providers of
emotional and material necessities for family members. Historically
this role-differentiated and defined marriage allowed us to indulge in
the myths of independence, autonomy, and self-sufficiency as
aspirations for both individuals and for family units.42 Myths about
independence and self-sufficiency were able to flourish and
perpetuate themselves because dependency was hidden. Contra-
dictory indications are viewed as failures due to the dependent nature
of some individuals or to the deviance of the family to which they
belong.41 Marriage and the marital family also had a societal role in
the definition of aspirations and expectations for individuals outside
of their family roles, as well as for other institutions. These myths are
behind many current policy debates, creating the dominant
perspective, which posits an autonomous and self-sufficient individual
as the societal ideal.
Those occupying otherwise competing political and policy
positions share belief in the attainability of the ideas of independence
and self-sufficiency. In this regard, it is important to note, whatever
differences exist between the libertarian and liberal positions, both
perspectives incorporate the division between public and private, and
both share the basic assumption that individual and family autonomy
and independence are not only desirable but also achievable. 4 In
traditional social policy thinking, the allocation for responsibility for
dependency has been satisfactorily made: the private family is
responsible for dependency, the market for distribution of social
goods, and the government for more or less facilitating and
supervising it all within appropriate restraints.
42. It is this basic shared set of assumptions that my earlier work on the inevitability of
dependency was meant to challenge. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 18.
43. Deviance in this regard can be because of the form of the family (such as a single
mother household) or because the family is not economically self-sufficient and must rely on
public subsidy to subsist.
44. See Governor Frank Keating of Oklahoma, Making Marriage Matter, Lecture before
the Heritage Foundation (Sept. 27, 2000) (discussing efforts to strengthen marriage as a means
to address out-of-wedlock births, violence, and drug abuse before members of the libertarian
organization), at http://www.heritage.org/library/lecture/hl684.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2001)
(on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review); see generally An Introduction to Libertarianism,
supra note 29; Liberalism in Liberalism As a Political Theory, Property and Market, supra note
30.
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B. Contract in Context- Background Rules
The feminist message of the past several decades has been that
most things are both public and private.4 Questioning of the public-
private compartmentalization is to some extent also a questioning of
the structure of the debates associated with the idea of a social
contract. If all is both public and private simultaneously, then the
labels will not resolve important questions concerning the current
allocation of authority and responsibility among family, market, and
state.
The deconstruction of the line between public and private has
not only been undertaken by feminists. Others have made similar
observations.46  The market may be posited as private in social
contract debates, but how it functions and what it produces are as
much of public concern as decisions about who may marry whom or
what are the economic ramifications of parenthood.
Beyond the arguments based on public concern about private
transactions, however, is another realization about the nature of the
market within society. Most private contracting is an ultimately
public activity so long as those who would contract must rely on law,
courts, and police power as the default enforcement mechanisms. It
seems sound public policy to allow some public monitoring to
determine what should be enforceable private arrangements (whether
inside or outside of the family) entitled to legal protection and
recognition and which are not. In fact, this is why the law sometimes
intervenes to regulate "private" contractual bargains and interposes
duties on contracting parties such as that of good faith and fair
dealing41
Contracts are not always enforced and sometimes they are
altered by practices independent of the individual parties to the
contract, such as custom. In addition, contract jurisprudence suggests
there are always "background conditions" to contracting as a
practice. 48  Often these background conditions are the assumed
45. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2, at 14-15.
46. See discussion of background conditions infra pp. 1424-26.
47. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000) (discussing court treatment of an unconscionable contract or
clause).
48. The Uniform Commercial Code contemplates changes in background conditions and
assigns liability. U.C.C. § 2-615 (2000) (providing for excuse by failure of presupposed
conditions). See Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the U.C.C., 29 DUQ. L.
REv. 221 (1991) (arguing for a broad interpretation of section 2-615, with greater consideration
of background conditions especially due to the relational nature of the relevant contracts).
Jeremy Waldron argues that in order for agreements and transactions between individual and
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existence of other societal institutions such as courts and law, which
are clearly in the public realm. Commentators have argued that the
traditional market paradigm, which views law as a response to market
failure, is wrong.49 Law is not properly viewed as a response to market
failure, but as a precondition to the development of "the market." The
existence of "background rules" (law) is necessary so that actors can
bargain and contract. This approach is distinct from typical law and
economics analysis in that law is posited as constitutive as well as
reactive. From this perspective, law is viewed as having a significant
and positive role in creating and sustaining the "market." As a social
and legal institution, the market does not exist independent of law.
Even more fundamentally, the market relies on law -law is necessary in
order for markets to function. A system of background or default rules
is required in order that competitive and voluntary transactions
(contracting) can take place.50
The notion of background conditions is simply the realization
that all agreements are made in a historic context where certain
preexisting structures and institutional arrangements are assumed.
Background conditions are essential to the process of bargaining and
contract. Established, predictable relationships and rules facilitate
the formation of new alignments since contracting parties are aware
of what will happen should the agreement not work out. In other
words, the parameters of any covenant are influenced by the external
arrangements as directly as they are set forth by specific terms.
Primary background conditions for contracts generally include law
and legal institutions that operate in predictable and consistent ways.
For the social contract, by contrast, a necessary background is the
marital family. This assertion is a way to bring the marital family to
the fore in the social contract debate
There are interesting and exciting questions presented by the
application of this idea of background rules to intimacy and the family.
If we perceive marriage as (at least partly) a contract, are there
background rules that facilitate the agreement to marry? If we assume
the idea of background rules is appropriately applied to the family, does
individual, or between individual and the state, to be operational there needs to be a context of
"rights" upon which the agreements are based-a fallback position in other words. JEREMY
WALDRON, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 370, 370-91 (1993). Waldron's "rights" represent the
background conditions upon which individuals can reasonably rely in the event that goodwill
and affection fail in interpersonal relations. Id.
49. See WALDRON, supra note 48, at 385-86.
50. Id. at 387.
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the introduction of agreements between sexual affiliates reveal
something about the strengths or weaknesses of our general thinking
about contract and background conditions?
Some of the initial work in applying the concepts of background
rules to the marriage context has already been done. Jeremy Waldron,
defending Kant's conception of marriage as contractual, conceptualizes
the idea of "rights" in ways that resonate with the theory of background
rules.5' Waldron states that the
function of matrimonial law... is to provide a basis on which ties of
love can be converted into legal responsibilities in the unhappy
situation where affection can no longer be guaranteed.... The
structure of impersonal rules and rights not only provides a
background guarantee; it also furnishes a basis on which people can
initiate new relations with other people even from a position of
alienation .... 51
Waldron asserts "the importance of a structure of rights that people can
count on for organizing their lives, a structure which stands somewhat
apart from communal or affective attachments and which can be relied
on to survive as a basis for action no matter what happens to those
attachments."5 3
C. Background, Instability, and Change
If we take the idea of background conditions and apply it to the
covenant we call the social contract, we encounter some interesting
questions. Specifically, how should we think about existing long-term
institutional expectations and aspirations for the individual, the
market, and the state when they are built upon something as
inherently unstable as today's marital family? What happens to these
societal institutions when the background condition upon which they
are premised is under contest-when arrangements are shifting and
becoming uncertain and unpredictable? 4 Specifically in regard to the
social contract: when does societal change signify the end of societal
consensus and necessitate that existing institutional arrangements be
renegotiated?
51. Id. at 370-91.
52. Id. at 376.
53. Id. at 379.
54. Other questions might include: What is the scope of the obligation of law and policy
(and, hence the state) to accommodate significant societal change? Can societal change achieve
such a transformation in context that injustice can be said to result without accommodation and
incorporation of the new background conditions into a new version of the social contract?
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If the existence of a certain type of family is a prerequisite for the
coherent development of the existing concepts of the "public" market
and state, what happens when we are forced to concede that there have
been widespread and not easily reversible changes in the way we think
about and practice family in the United States?55
Changes in the family are visible and undeniable. The law has
responded to these changes on one level by altering the set of
expectations, obligations, and entitlements governing the intra-family
relationship between the spouses-family law. What we have not done,
however, is to consider the required restructuring of extra-family
relationships given the changes in the family-the alteration of the state,
the market, and the individual that must correspond to and complement
our "new" family. In this context, it is not the obligations and rights of
"husbands" and "wives" that need restatement, but the relationship
among the state, the market, the family, and individuals, now freed from
the historic family expectations and roles. What social expectations
apply to the relationships among the state, market, and man (outside his
former category as "husband") or woman (outside her former category
as "wife")? The changes in the family were provoked by (and further
provoke) changes in other institutions. 6 The ideology about state
intervention and action must also shift in the context of change.
The questions raised in regard to the ideas of background
conditions and change are significant in light of the fundamental
alterations over the past several decades to the basic societal
institutions of family and the workplace (a primary market
institution),7 These institutions have been designated by our social
contract ideology to be the primary deliverers of social goods in this
country. Families "voluntarily" take care of us, provide for our needs
throughout our lifetimes (and periods of dependency). Through
"contract" and "bargaining," the workplace, in addition to providing
wages, supplies insurance against catastrophe through such things as
health care coverage and pension plans.5 8 These institutions in their
55. Arising within this inquiry are questions concerning the bargaining opportunities that have
been excluded from the generalized realm of "private" contract by being relegated to the special
(and "publicly" regulated) category of marriage? Of course, a related question that arises from this
articulation of this issue is whether such exclusion undermines the use of contract theory as the way
to generate universal concepts to discuss abstract interactions of bargain and exchange in society.
56. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 1919 (noting that the changes in the workplace are
creating a situation where all workers are experiencing the problems and dilemma that have
traditionally faced women).
57. Id. at 1921-28 (documenting the threatening changes in the workplace).
58. But see id. at 1925 (noting the rise in contingent and temporary workers working
without benefits).
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historic roles as dispensers of social goods are the background
conditions to the social contract representing American capitalist
democracy. It is a system in which there are no citizenship "rights" or
claims to social goods that can be enforced against government.5 9
But, both family and workplace have changed so fundamentally over
the past several decades that it is impossible to continue to view them
as background to a privatized and individualized society. The historic
premises of the social contract have changed, and it would be unjust
to consider these institutions, as they now exist, as adequate to their
historic assigned tasks. The argument that we must reconsider the
terms of the social contract is stronger since the state has participated
in and facilitated these changes, particularly those in the family.
Of course, not all changes are good and not all changes should be
accepted and facilitated. The measure should be whether change
represents progress for the society as measured by fundamental
aspirations. Changes in the family (such as more women in the
workplace and the demise of separate spheres ideology) push us more
toward equality and inclusion. Women's position is no longer inferior
or formally burdened with disadvantages and this represents progress.
On the other hand, many of the changes in the market have operated to
restrict inclusion and to further inequality. These changes include
falling family income and few or no opportunities for those with little
education or training, which disproportionately affect women.60 These
changes must be vigorously addressed by a responsive and active state.
IV. DISSOLVING BACKGROUNDS
A. The Tentative Family
The family is our quintessentially "private" institution, yet it has
a decidedly public role in our ideology. 61 We historically relied on the
family to manage dependency. The family is the conceptual and
ideological repository for dependency-the institution whereby
dependency becomes labeled a private rather than a public concern.
Yet, changes in our expectations and aspirations for families have
been profound.
59. But see id. at 1928 (arguing for a right to work).
60. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 531,
546-48 (2000).
61. See Fineman, supra note 2, at 14-16.
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The transformations in the institution of the family are the result
of two related "revolutions" in our way of thinking and both are
reflected in law-the no-fault divorce revolution, which altered our
view of marriage and the gender equality revolution, which altered
the way women perceive their societal, nonfamilial roles.
Historically the family was a hierarchically organized system with
well-defined gender roles. Marriage was perceived as a lifelong
commitment, and the state heavily regulated exit from the institution.
A husband's economic responsibility as head of the household gave
him certain rights to discipline and control the subservient wife and
children. A wife who conformed to the expectations of fidelity and
obedience imposed by society had the right to insist even in the
context of divorce that she be supported by her husband, provided
with the necessaries of life. Women were excluded from many of the
public aspects of life and their true calling considered the home and
family.62
No-fault divorce has certainly altered that historic situation, and
rules limiting husbands' financial obligations have made reliance on
marriage as a lifetime guarantor for economically dependent mothers
and wives less realistic. 63 In addition, we no longer think of marriage
as hierarchical. Our new model for marriage is that of partnership, an
62. See generally Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (holding that
a contract between spouses to change the essential incidents of the marriage is void).
63. The state has redefined its traditional protective role vis-A-vis marriage and the spouses as
individuals within marriage. No-fault divorce rules reflect the abandonment by the state of an
expressed interest in maintaining the marital relationship unless one guilty spouse has transgressed
and injured the other (innocent) one. See Fineman, supra note 33, at 396 (discussing the emergence
of egalitarian models of family and no-fault divorce). Of course, the state's concern with dissolution
of marriage continues to be manifested in regulations concerning the consequences of dissolution
should it occur; but even here there have been changes reflecting the view that marriage is a
voluntary association that can be terminated at will with few consequences transcending the marital
tie. Manifesting both egalitarian and individualistic presumptions, for example, rules now decree
that divorced women are expected to be capable of self-support and are not deserving of alimony or
maintenance based on their status as an innocent ex-spouse. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACr ("UMDA") § 308, 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998 & Supp. 2000) (Maintenance).
Do such profound changes in a significant social institution effect our expectations and
understanding of the justice and fairness of existing terms in our "social contract" (the set of
expectations and entitlements that define the relationship between state and individual)?
Specifically, once the status and nature of marriage has been altered by the state through its
laws and legal institutions-the relationship between the spouses adjusted and the state's
interest in marriage redefined-is there not an obligation for society to also reconsider the
continued appropriateness of the traditional societal role marriage has been assigned? If the
terms of the marital contract are altered, should we not reflect on whether the functional role
that the family plays within society must, of necessity, also be altered?
In other words, when the state actively participates in engineering background shifts, even
merely acquiesces in such shifts, is there not a corresponding obligation to readjust perspective,
perhaps rebuild or abandon some of the structures thus rendered askew? It seems to me that
the possibility for change has important theoretical implications for public policy and law.
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egalitarian concept that recognizes that both spouses make
contributions, even if they differ in kind. Further, wives and mothers
are now expected to be able to participate in the workforce, fathers
and husbands to share responsibility for domestic tasks and
caretaking.
The equality imagery in marriage reflects a more generalized
societal transformation associated with women's roles. The equality
revolution has occasioned wide participation by women in the
workforce. Young women expect to have equal access to education
and workplace opportunities, and law formally embodies these
principles and aspirations. In fact, as the revisions in welfare and
divorce policy during the past several decades indicate, society has
moved far from the historic idea that women's place was in the home.
Further, the changes in aspirations for individual women have quickly
moved to an expectation on the part of the society that they will
work, even if they are caretakers. Not satisfied with merely ensuring
equal opportunity in all spheres of life, the current expectation is that
mothers will participate in the workplace and must not rely on the
state or an ex-spouse to fund stay-at-home caretaking.64
Even if women's aspirations for themselves (and society's
demands of them) had not changed, other forces have pushed women
into wage work. Prime among these forces is the reality of middle-
class wage stagnation, coupled with inflation. Most middle-class
families now require at least a wage and a half to maintain the same
standard of living possible on a "family wage" of decades ago.61
Women, who used to be caretakers within the family, are now direct
market participants. In addition, more and more families only have
one parent present.66 Work and structure mean many families are
potentially left without a full-time caretaker. What happens to
dependency in those families?
The point is that, whether embraced as individual liberation,
imposed by social policy, or mandated by economic necessity,
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1994 & Supp. III 1998) (originally enacted as Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 407,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996)) (describing mandatory work requirements).
65. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 28, available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edullibrary/e-archive/govjreports/
futurework/ch3.pdf (noting that "other factors in the increased participation of women likely
include the need for a second income to keep up with the rising cost of living") (on file with the
Chicago-Kent Law Review); see also Schultz, supra note 19, at 1920-21 (listing the trends in
labor that threaten negative consequences for social and individual life).
66. See FUCHS, supra note 19, at 73 (noting the increase in single mothers in the
workplace).
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women's changed relationship with the workforce and the alterations
to the institution of marriage should weaken our confidence in the
ability of the family as the primary societal institution designated to
manage its members' dependency over their lifetimes. Our altered
contemporary egalitarian family is a much more tentative institution
than that historically imagined. It is more structured by individual
whim than by state imposed consequences. Such a family cannot
comfortably be assumed to be the primary repository for dependency.
Nor can it be confined to the background of policy debates.
We must look at the reality of the contemporary family and
consider the implications of its transformation from the historic
model. We must explicitly reconsider our institutional arrange-
ments.67  If it seems clear that the contemporary family cannot
conveniently be relied upon to fulfill historic expectations, then
responsibility for dependency must be reallocated.
This part of the discussion-the concept of background rules-is
relevant in the context of my realization that the family, particularly as
defined by and through the marital unit, serves an essential public
function in our society. This function has ideological and structural
dimensions that shape political and policy discourse and influence law.68
The role assigned the family also has significant implications for those
operating within families. Family members are assigned roles with
economic and material consequences.69 These consequences are often
not revealed until the family dissolves such as with the death or divorce
or in cases where the full complement of roles is not filled.
Consequences, both to the individual and to society, may also become
apparent when the family fails in its assigned societal role (or enough
families fail) and demands for collective response are made.
The concept of background conditions is particularly useful to
illustrate why we need to rethink old paradigms, set aside the
misleading discourses about personal versus public responsibility, and
cast a skeptical eye on current renditions of the metanarratives of
independence and self-sufficiency. Using the idea of background
conditions it is possible to argue that it is time to rewrite our social
contract, to reconsider the viability and equity of our existing social
configurations and assumptions.
67. See KITAY, supra note 28; see also id. at 133-24.
68. See Fineman, supra note 33, at 400.
69. See id.; FUCHS, supra note 19, at 73.
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B. The Tenuous Workplace
Similar points about the need for rethinking the social contract
given changes in the family can be made about transformations in the
workplace. There are important differences, however, primarily in
the nature or direction of change. Changes in the workplace have not
mostly been in the direction of equality and participation. 0 In
addition, progressive change in the workplace is harder to envision or
articulate since there is no idealized form of relationship to exemplify
equality between worker and employer like the partnership notion of
husband and wife. The absence of a competing ideal makes it more
difficult to displace the historic model.
The worker-employer relationship is one of "real" as well as
social contract, although, outside of collective bargaining agreements
and some minimal governmental regulations, the historic workplace
contract remains largely an unwritten one. Still, workplace terms are
embodied in practices that have evolved over time. From a worker's
perspective, the employment-at-will doctrine never provided much
security, yet assumptions about employer responsibility to employees
(at least managerial and white collar employees) and the expectation
that employment would secure some basic social goods did shift in the
mid-twentieth century.7
Things are shifting backwards and, while the ultimate direction
of change is not as clear as in the case of families, some trends seem
apparent.72 For example, any expectation that employment security
for any segment of the workforce could be earned through long and
loyal service is now illusory.73 Even this relatively minimal promise
has been abandoned by many large corporations in favor of
downsizing and profit-driven measures that seem to view labor as just
another expense of production to be manipulated and contained.74
Various statistical summaries report that temporary employment
status is rapidly becoming the norm for many new entries into the
workplace as well as one of the few options for those terminated from
70. But see Unlawful Employment Practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
71. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 522-23 (2001)
(reviewing the history of employment trends through the twentieth century and in recent years).
72. Id. at 523-24.
73. See id. at 541-47 (analyzing job tenure rates as an indicator of the precariousness of
employment).
74. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 1924-25 (discussing the decline in job security and an
increase in contingent work).
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more traditional work situations." Temporary workers do not receive
the benefits associated with more enduring ties to employers:
Even those with formally more traditional relationships find
benefits dwindling. Increasing numbers of employers who previously
did so, no longer feel it necessary to provide social goods such as
health care, pension funds, and other dependency-related insurances
for employees.76 Attempts to limit or cut back on existing benefits are
now part of many negotiations. Furthermore, from a historic
perspective, the real wages for workers have declined and the idea of
a family wage has been replaced by the reality of a dual earner
couple. Employers and capitalists articulate their social responsibility
in terms that leave workers behind. Allegiance is to stockholders, not
employees.
Perhaps the ease with which the terms and nature of the
unwritten understanding of employers' responsibilities to workers
have been altered is related to the attacks on unions that have
occurred during the last few decades. In the past when collective
bargaining was in ascendancy, unions functioned to secure some
social rights for some workers, moderating the harshness of
unfettered capitalism through collective bargaining and contract.
These rights served as models for other workers and employers, even
if the specific contract terms were not directly applicable.
Unions have always been under attack by business and corporate
interests, but attacks have increased in intensity and found more
receptive political ears in recent years. Membership declined during
the Reagan years after the air controllers' strike and the passage of
legislation designed to weaken unions in the name of individual
worker's rights.77 In recent years, unions have struggled to reshape
themselves, not only by reaching out to new groups of potential
members, but also by using political means.7 8 Concern has broadened
beyond specific member contractual entitlement in some areas to the
provision of political support for initiatives that benefit society (or
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1924.
77. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at 453
(119th ed. 1999) (Table 718, entitled "Labor Union Membership, by Sector: 1983-1988,"
showing a decline in union membership).
78. For example, labor has engaged in issue advertising as a way to interest new members.
This has brought them under increased scrutiny by those opposing the use of soft money. See
generally Steven Greenhouse, Bush Is Moving to Reduce Labor's Political Coffers, N.Y TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2001, at A14.
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workers) in general-a more universalized and class-based approach
to the provision of fundamental social goods.7 9
Also worthy of mention in the context of change is the way that
wealth distribution has become more skewed as a result of other
changes in both structure and attitude of capitalists. 8° At the same
time that wageworkers and others who have previously considered
themselves comfortably and securely middle class find their fortunes
declining, huge fortunes are made by corporate officers and
entrepreneurs.8 The differentiation between worker and manager is
greater in the United States than in any other industrialized
democracy.82
Outside of the terms of labor contracts they forge with unions,
businesses and corporations do not consider themselves appropriately
held responsible for meeting workers' needs or desires. They resist
the imposition of socially responsible mandates such as the Family
and Medical Leave Act, which places no requirement of funding upon
employers, merely mandating that they allow their workers to self-
fund this particular social good, a leave for social caretaking of
children, parents, or other dependent relatives.83  With even a
minimalist work contract torn asunder by the asserted demands of a
global marketplace, the myth that the market can and will provide
protection cannot be maintained.84
79. The response to revitalized union activity by many Republican politicians has been to
seek to enact legislation to burden such action. For example, President Bush intends to issue an
executive order requiring federal contractors "to post a notice telling workers they have a right
not to pay that part of union fees used for political activities." Id.
80. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 1926 (discussing the incidence and ramifications of
increasing wage inequality).
81. Id.
82. AFL-CIO, CEO Pay and Global Unfairness, at http://www.aflcio.org/paywatch/ceo-
pay.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (noting that in 1999, American CEOs made 475 times the
average blue collar worker, while German CEOs made 13 times the typical manufacturing
employee and Japanese CEOs made 11 times the average worker) (on file with the Chicago-
Kent Law Review).
83. See Cathy Keim, Business: Loose Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at
1H (reporting that "more employers are vexed by the Family and Medical Leave Act, which
gives workers 12 weeks of unpaid leave. About 36 percent of 1839 employers surveyed by the
Labor Department say compliance is difficult, up from 15 percent five years ago"); see also
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
84. Although voluntary charity and philanthropy are not the objects of the social contract
configuration with which I am dealing, it is important to point out that they prove to be no
substitutes for governmental mandates when it comes to business responsibility. Inventors and
investors have accumulated huge fortunes, but such financial success has not made their holders
socially uncomfortable. Giving is relatively miserly and much more narrowly directed than at
the turn of the last century, an earlier era of capital consolidation and transformation. Today,
philanthropy seems more industry related or self-enhancing than the generalized public
institution building that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century. Andrew Carnegie may
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C. The Tenable State
Of necessity, the state is implicated in any discussion of the social
contract. As one of the primary social institutions, the state is
affected by transformations in other institutions. In addition, the
state may have a responsive or regulating role to play in regard to
change. State transformation is a much more public and scrutinized
process than family or market evolutions. In fact, state policy
discussions (which are the way the definition of the state is altered)
often implicate family and/or market developments as the basis for
state action or inaction. In this way, the state is a more explicitly
reactive institution. Unfortunately, noninterventionists and conserv-
atives often view the appropriate role of the state as cheerleader for
the market." The state should facilitate, not regulate economic
arenas.
All of this occurs in the context of arguments by government
policymakers and business leaders for increasing the spheres of
influence and power of the market. The new vision is of a minimalist
government, accomplished through the privatization of functions
previously performed by government and the devolution of necessary
government tasks to the smallest units of government. This
restructuring is urged in spite of the fact that it has always been a
struggle to hold the market or capitalists responsible for provision of
social goods, such as health insurance, daycare, or a minimum family
wage, in this country.
Complementing the way we now view the state (perhaps laying
an essential foundation for a minimalist state) has been an
ascendancy of economic principles as the preferred method of
assessing social policy. For several decades the prevailing philosophy
has been a supply-side orientation that posits the well-being of the
capitalist class will provide for the rest of society ultimately. Termed
"trickle down" economics, this theory has proven in this time of
unprecedented expansion of national wealth to be an illusion.86
have built libraries, but Bill Gates donates to them computer equipment that will illustrate to
users the wonders of Microsoft while a scolding Ted Turner contributes funds to show the
United States how to pay off its debt to the United Nations. See Ron Kampeas, Billionaires
Calling Shots on Charitable Donations, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Feb. 7,2001, at C02.
85. See generally An Introduction to Libertarianism, supra note 29.
86. President George W. Bush's views on taxes propose a return to trickle down policies.
For example, he proposes to cap the top tax rate at 33%, down from 39.6%, in order to
encourage entrepreneurship and economic growth. George W. Bush for President Official Site:
Issues: Taxes, at http://www.georgewbush.com/issues/taxes.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2001) (on
file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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Further, policies and practices developed fairly recently, such as the
Federal Reserve System's highly publicized focus on inflationary
indicators based on workers' improved status, seem to ensure that not
too much trickles down.7
A focus on market well-being has supplanted more inclusive and
nuanced public assessments about national direction. The trans-
formation in the focus of the public sphere is best captured by the
way in which the well-being of the nation is currently measured. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average is reported daily (even hourly on
public radio) as though this reflected our country's health and wealth,
an economic indicator substituting for other forms of evaluation of
national standing such as the equitableness of the distribution of the
wealth the society is producing or the well-being of the most
vulnerable of our citizens. We seem blinded in a revere of self-
satisfaction even as the position of our children and the historically
disadvantaged subgroups in society deteriorates both from where
they were a few decades ago and relative to the positions of these
groups in other industrialized democracies.
It is as though the function and role of the state has been merged
with those of the market. There is some effort to defend public
programs such as education, but the basic tenets of a privatized and
individualized philosophy seem to be driving policy on all political
sides. Missing from public discourse is strong support for the role of
the state in mediating market excesses and insuring a more equitable
allocation of the wealth the society is producing. Perhaps this
component is missing because the nature of public debate is so
contrived and constricted, confined to politicians and those with
access to them instead of engaging a wider and more diverse group of
citizens.
V. REVITALIZING THE PUBLIC-FORGING A NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT
Reintegration of family, market, and state should begin with a
few basic premises. First, dependency is of general concern and
generalized responsibility. Second, caretaking requires resources, and
engaging in caretaking has costs to individuals even in a society that
87. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Lifts Key Rate by 1/2 Point to 6.5%, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2000, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/financial/fed/051700fed-rates.html
(indicating that low unemployment was a key factor that led to concerns about inflation) (on file
with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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shares some of the burdens of caretaking. Therefore, subsidies must
be of two kinds-some specific to support the caretaking task while
others take the form of lifelong provisions of fundamental social
goods necessary for individual survival and flourishing. These social
goods are economic or financial in nature and include housing, health
care, a basic income, and other necessities that complement and
strengthen the civil and political rights we have as citizens of a
democracy. The government has a crucial and nondelegatable
responsibility to secure that these goods are delivered independent of
the market value of any individual labor. This responsibility marks a
right of citizenship no less important and worthy of governmental
protection than civil and political rights and can be realized in a
variety of ways.
In regard to the subsidies that are specifically directed at
caretaking, the state must function in two basic redistributive
channels-some income redistribution will be necessary to provide
for services such as childcare and some restructuring of the workplace
will be required so that the market can ante-up its fair share of the
costs of responding to dependency. The task is that of structuring
accommodation. 8  The state must see that market institutions
respond to dependency burdens born by workers dually responsible
for economic and caretaking sufficiency. Workplaces must be
restructured so that the burdens for dependency can also be
redistributed in a more just manner as between family and market-
so that caretakers have a meaningful "right to work" as well as a
responsibility, a right enforceable through a demand for resources
and accommodation.
This restructuring is not "special" treatment, but a version of the
basic right to accommodation due to all members of society as they
engage in society-enhancing or -preserving tasks. It is consistent with
our deeply held beliefs about individual responsibility and
independence. Individual independence requires that those who
perform vital societal functions have the wherewithal to do the tasks
they assume and those resources must be supplied outside of
potentially exploitative, and therefore corrupting, institutions. We
88. For a discussion of accommodation as conceived of in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, see Ronald D. Wenkart, Public Employment, Reasonable Accommodation and the ADA,
133 EDUc. L. REP. 647, 653-54 (1999); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2000) (defining
"reasonable accommodation").
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owe caretakers the resources that ensure the opportunity for
independence and self-sufficiency and allow the exercise of discretion
and selection from among options. Independence in this regard is the
ability to make decisions and act with integrity, to fashion one's life
and fulfill one's obligations within societal structures that are
responsive to needs and provide compensation and accommodation
for dependency. The obligations of society can be delegated as the
responsibility of select members only when we, as a society, are
willing to recognize and repay the debt that we thus incur-
implementing a just social compact.
While some conservative commentators might respond to pleas
for the (relatively) modest economic adjustments by reference to
individualistic notions such as bearing the consequences of one's
choice and the sanctity of personal responsibility, I suspect that the
problem for more progressive readers will be with the restructuring
component of my reorientation. In contemplating a restructured
workplace, for example, those without responsibility for dependency
will fear that they will bear the costs of accommodation and change.8 9
In other words, one aspect of resistance is the fear of the exploitation
now suffered by caretakers being displaced onto them.
In response to this resistance I point out that if we take the
position of the caretaker in our society as the starting point, it
becomes obvious that exploitation is the norm. In our current
societal configuration, the labor of caretakers is appropriated for the
good of the larger society without compensation or accommodation
from that society's institutions outside of the family. It is essential to
keep our sights on this larger picture, to see the implications of
societal arrangements. It is necessary to constantly force our eyes
beyond the details of our individual workplaces and our current
personal circumstances.
Within the workplace, we are isolated from others, encouraged
to view the provision of goods to one group to be simultaneously and
inevitably at the cost of another group of workers. 90 There are costs
associated with caretaking. But the question to be asked is in what
way is it just or fair that corporations and businesses are free to
merely shift burdens and costs from one group of workers to another.
How can they escape responsibility and avoid bearing some of the
89. See, e.g., BURKETr, supra note 1, at 37-45.
90. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND
HOME BECOMES WORK 118-21 (1997) (noting that fathers who take parental leave may be
viewed as doing so at the expense of other workers).
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costs by accommodation and by accepting some reduction in profits
or diminished returns on capital?
Further, we must also realize that even if we are unencumbered
today, we do not know what the future holds. We may become
caretakers ourselves. In this regard, even if we view having children
as a choice, all of us had parents (no choice about that), and many of
these parents may become dependent on us as they age. 91 We
ourselves might become the disabled or dependent rather than the
caretaker in the future.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, and directed toward those progressive proponents
of privatization, I want to insist that while the exploitation claim of
the caretaker who provides the uncompensated labor that reproduces
society may be the most compelling, its character is not unique from
the claims that can be made by noncaretakers in our increasingly
workaholic society. An argument can be made that caretaking labor
should not be viewed as socially productive only when directed at
improving the situation of others-human beings must also provide
for our own nonmaterial needs. Beyond our responsibilities as
caretakers, citizens, and workers, we have responsibilities to
ourselves-to regenerate our energies and resources, to participate in
the artistic, nonmaterial, spiritual, or other inner-directed aspects of
life upon which we are all dependent for our individual well-being.
Society and its institutions must facilitate this type of caretaking also,
structuring work so that the rest of life is not forfeited. The scripts of
our lives must revolve around more than just work with more
emotional and spirit regenerative aspects left lying on the cutting
room floor.
It is also possible to expand ideas about the social contract and
the existence of social debt well beyond caretaking labor (for others
or for self). We could consider the situation of the laborer in
general.92 The social contract metaphor can be a way to bring
nonmarket values, such as norms of distributive justice and worker
security found in other industrialized democracies, to bear on our
91. See Clark Freshman, Re-Visioning the Dependency Crisis and the Negotiator's
Dilemma: Reflections on the Sexual Family and the Mother-Child Dyad, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 97 (1997) (reviewing FINEMAN, supra note 12).
92. Schultz also argues for a living wage, the right to work, empowering work conditions,
and reduced hours for all workers. Schultz, supra note 19, at 1942-57.
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society as we confront the implications of change. Particularly in the
market context, we need to be reminded that corporations as abstract
legal entities and those who run, direct, and profit from them cannot
function without the labor of others. Secretaries and truck drivers are
as essential to commerce as are highly paid CEOs and stockholders.
The arguments made about exploitation in regard to caretaking
are applicable to the situation of those who are providing for the
needs, growth, and maintenance of society and its institutions but
whose labor is undervalued within our version of the ideology of free
market capitalism. The arguments that began with recognition of
caretaking evolve into a claim for universal provision of basic social
goods based simply on recognition of un- or undercompensated
contributions to society and its institutions and the fact that
contributions should be valued in a public, positive, and egalitarian
fashion. After all, we are all in this together, and this realization
should guide the direction in which we take our discourse about
dependency and societal responsibility.
